Yemen: States should support accountability for crimes under international law
Joint Civil Society Letter:
States should support accountability for crimes under international law committed in Yemen at the 48th Session of the Human Rights Council
Joint Civil Society Letter:
States should support accountability for crimes under international law committed in Yemen at the 48th Session of the Human Rights Council
Today, the ICJ delivered a statement to the UN Human Rights Council calling for accountability for crimes against humanity committed in Myanmar during the Interactive Dialogue on the report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
The statement reads as follows:
“Madame President,
The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) welcomes the recent report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
The widespread gross violations of human rights documented in the report – including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detention- underscore the need for urgent measures of accountability to redress these and to deter further violations.
ICJ has documented further evidence that the unlawful crackdown against peaceful protestors have continued to worsen leading to more extrajudicial killings. More than 50 people have already been unlawfully killed and several hundreds have been severely injured.
Hundreds of others have been arbitrarily arrested and detained, with some subjected to torture and ill-treatment. As the scale of violations continues to increase in many parts of the country, these attacks have become systematic and widespread, and must be investigated as crimes against humanity.
The ICJ therefore supports the recommendations made by the Special Rapporteur, including for referral of the situation to the ICC.
The ICJ urges the Council to adopt a resolution that would strengthen and support the IIMM’s work to collect and preserve evidence for accountability; and to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, including to ensure the immediate, full and unrestricted monitoring of the situations and prompt and effective implementation of their recommendations.
Thank you.”
Contact:
Massimo Frigo, ICJ UN Representative, e: massimo.frigo(a)icj.org, t: +41797499949
The escalating killing of peaceful protestors by Myanmar’s security forces should be independently investigated as possible crimes against humanity, said the ICJ today on the eve of a closed-door UN Security Council session on the situation.
According to reliable information provided to the ICJ, security forces have unlawfully killed approximately 50 unarmed people – including at least five children – in more than 10 cities on different days since the military overthrew the civilian government on 1 February 2021. On 3 March, at least 38 people were reported killed by security forces.
In addition, numerous protestors have been injured and a total of 1,498 people have been arrested, charged or sentenced in relation to the military coup, according to The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP).
“As the scale of the violence continues to increase, seemingly as part of a systematic, centralized policy to use lethal force against peaceful protestors, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Myanmar’s security forces are perpetrating crimes against humanity,” said Kingsley Abbott, Director of Global Accountability and International Justice at the ICJ. “This underscores the urgent need for all states, including the permanent members of the UN Security Council, to stop shielding the Myanmar military and work together towards opening avenues to justice for the Myanmar people.”
The UN Security Council will meet this Friday for a closed-door session at the request of the United States which is President of the Council in March 2021.
“The UN Security Council should immediately refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court for a full independent and effective investigation,” added Abbott.
In addition to acts that may constitute murder as a crime against humanity, security forces have also reportedly committed acts which, when committed in a widespread and systematic manner, would amount to other crimes against humanity, including imprisonment, torture, and enforced disappearance – all of which also go towards supporting the existence of an attack.
“These killings and other crimes under international law are a direct result of the culture of impunity that has been allowed to persist in Myanmar for decades,” added Abbott. “All states should support the different accountability initiatives underway, including the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar which is collecting evidence for use in future legal proceedings.”
“It is long past time for perpetrators of serious human rights violations in the country to be brought to justice before the International Criminal Court or in any national jurisdictions willing and able to exercise universal jurisdiction.”
Background
On 12 September 2018, following an independent investigation, the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar called for Myanmar’s military to be “…investigated and prosecuted in an international criminal tribunal for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes” concerning alleged violations in Shan, Kachin and Rakhine States and elsewhere throughout the country.
Under general international law, including customary international law and treaties and statutes of international criminal courts, crimes against humanity must be prosecuted. The authoritative definition of crimes against humanity is contained in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, for killings to amount to crimes against humanity, they must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. According to the elements of crimes of the Rome Statute, “’Attack directed against a civilian population’ in these context elements is understood to mean a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack. The acts need not constitute a military attack. It is understood that ‘policy to commit such attack’ requires that the State or organization actively promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population.”
Generally speaking, “widespread” refers to the geographical scope of the attack and the number of victims, but not exclusively. “Systematic” refers to the organized nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence.
Myanmar is not a State Party to the Rome Statute of the ICC. However, the ICC is investigating crimes committed against the Rohingya minority as part of waves of violence in Rakhine State in 2016 and 2017 where one element or part of the crime was committed inside Bangladesh, which is a party to the Rome Statute. The ICC would be able to conduct a full investigation of the situation in Myanmar if the UN Security Council used its Chapter VII powers to refer the matter to the ICC pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.
Universal jurisdiction refers to the legal concept that States have the authority, and in some cases the obligation, to bring proceedings in relation to certain crimes, including crimes against humanity, because they are so serious it does not matter where the crimes were committed or the nationality of the perpetrators or the victims. States are generally entitled to exercise jurisdiction for serious under crimes under international law.
Contact
Kingsley Abbott, ICJ Director of Global Accountability and International Justice; e: kingsley.abbott(a)icj.org
Sam Zarifi, ICJ’s Secretary General, sam.zarifi(a)icj.org
The ICJ joined other civil society organisations in addressing the UN Human Rights Council, on the successes and failures of its 39th session, concluding today.
The statement, read by International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), was as follows:
“This session, the Council adopted landmark resolutions on several country situations, further enhancing its contribution to the protection of human rights.
On Myanmar, we welcome the creation of the independent investigative mechanism, which is an important step towards accountability for the horrific crimes committed in Myanmar, as elaborated in the FFM’s report to this session. The overwhelming support for the resolution, notwithstanding China’s shameful blocking of consensus, was a clear message to victims and survivors that the international community stands with them in their fight for justice.
On Yemen, the Council demonstrated that principled action is possible, and has sent a strong message to victims of human rights violations in Yemen that accountability is a priority for the international community, by voting in favour of renewing the mandate of the Group of Eminent Experts to continue international investigations into violations committed by all parties to the conflict.
Furthermore, we welcome the leadership by a group of States on the landmark resolution on Venezuela, and consider it as an important step for the Council applying objective criteria to address country situations that warrant its attention. The resolution, adopted with support from all UN regions, sends a strong message of support to the Venezuelan people. By opening up a space for dialogue at the Council, the resolution brings scrutiny to the tragic human rights and humanitarian crisis unfolding in the country.
While we welcome the renewal of the mandate of the Commission of Inquiry (CoI) on Burundi, to continue its critical investigation and work towards accountability, however we regret that the Council failed to respond more strongly to Burundi’s record of non-cooperation and attacks against the UN human rights system.
We also welcome the Council’s adoption of the resolution on Syria, which among other things condemns all violations and abuses of international human rights law and all violations of international humanitarian law committed by all parties to the conflict.
However, on other country situations including China, Sudan, Cambodia and the Philippines, the Council failed to take appropriate action.
On Sudan, we are deeply concerned about the weak resolution that envisions an end to the Independent Expert’s mandate once an OHCHR office is set up; a “deal” Sudan has already indicated it does not feel bound by, and which is an abdication of the Council’s responsibility to human rights victims in Sudan while grave violations are ongoing. At a minimum, States should ensure the planned country office monitors and publicly reports on the human rights situation across Sudan, and that the High Commissioner is mandated to report to the Council on the Office’s findings.
We also regret the lack of concerted Council action on the Philippines, in spite of the need to establish independent international and national investigations into extrajudicial killings in the government’s ‘war on drugs’, and to monitor and respond to the government’s moves toward authoritarianism.
In addition, we regret the Council’s weak response to the deepening human rights and the rule of law crisis in Cambodia, failing to change its approach even when faced with clear findings by the Special Rapporteur demonstrating that the exclusive focus on technical assistance and capacity building in the country is failing.
We share the concerns that many raised during the session, including the High Commissioner, about China’s own human rights record, specifically noting serious violations of the rights of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities in Xinjiang province. It is regrettable that States did not make a concrete and collective call for action by China to cease the internment of estimates ranging up to 1 million individuals from these communities.
On thematic resolutions, we welcome the adoption of the resolution on equal participation in political and public affairs but would have preferred a stronger endorsement and implementation of the Guidelines.
The resolution on safety of journalists, adopted by consensus, sets out a clear roadmap of practical actions to end impunity for attacks. Journalism is not a crime – yet too many States in this room simply imprison those that criticize them. This must end, starting with the implementation of this resolution.
We welcome the adoption by consensus of the resolution on preventable maternal mortality and morbidity and human rights in humanitarian settings. Women and girls affected by conflict have been denied accountability for too long. The implementation of this resolution will ensure that their rights, including their sexual and reproductive health and rights, are respected, protected and fulfilled.
Finally, the Council’s first interactive dialogue on reprisals was an important step to ensure accountability for this shameful practice, and we urge more States to have the courage and conviction to stand up for defenders and call out countries that attack and intimidate them.”
Signatories:
On October 16, 1998, the former dictator of Chile Augusto Pinochet was arrested in London on a warrant from a Spanish judge. Reed Brody participated in the subsequent legal case.
Reed Brody went on to apply the “Pinochet precedent” in the landmark prosecution of the former dictator of Chad, Hissène Habré, who was convicted of crimes against humanity in Senegal in 2016.
He now works with victims of the former dictator of Gambia, Yahya Jammeh. The ICJ interviewed Brody about the Pinochet case and its legacy.
What was your role in the Pinochet case?
My role started when Pinochet was arrested in London. The case began long before that, of course, in the early years of Pinochet’s dictatorship when brave human rights activists documented each case of murder, and “disappearance.”
The ICJ worked with those advocates to produce a seminal 1974 report on those crimes, just six months after Pinochet’s coup. Shut out of Chile’s courts, even after the democratic transition of 1990, victims and their lawyers pursued a case against Pinochet in Spain under its “universal jurisdiction” law and when Pinochet traveled to London, Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón requested and obtained his detention.
When Pinochet challenged his arrest in court claiming immunity as a former head of state, I went to London for Human Rights Watch, and we and Amnesty International were granted the right to intervene with teams of lawyers in the proceedings at the judicial committee of the House of Lords, then Britain’s highest court.
The Lords cited our research in rejecting Pinochet’s immunity.
You famously described the Lords’ Pinochet decision as a “wake-up call” to tyrants everywhere. Looking back, do you think it was?
Actually no, I think one would be hard pressed to discern a change in the behavior of dictators. Mugabe didn’t quake in his boots, Saddam didn’t clean up his act.
The more important and more lasting effect of the case was to give hope to other victims and activists. When the Lords ruled that Pinochet could be arrested anywhere in the world despite his status as a former head of state, the movement was in effervescence.
As a human rights lawyer, I was used to being legally and morally right, but still losing. In the Pinochet case, not only did we win, but we upheld the detention of one of the world’s most iconic dictators.
The Pinochet case inspired victims of abuse in country after country, particularly in Latin America, to challenge the transitional arrangements of the 1980s and 1990s, which allowed the perpetrators of atrocities to go unpunished and, often, to remain in power.
These temporary accommodations with the ancien régime didn’t extinguish the victims’ thirst to bring their former tormentors to justice.
How did you go from Pinochet to Habré?
With Pinochet, we saw that universal jurisdiction could be used as an instrument to bring to book people who seemed out of the reach of justice.
Together with groups like Amnesty, the FIDH, and the ICJ (which wrote an important report on the Pinochet case and its lessons), we had meetings on who could be the “next Pinochet.”
That’s when Delphine Djiraibe of the Chadian Association for Human Rights asked us to help Habre’s victims bring him to justice in his Senegalese exile.
I was excited at the prospect of persuading a country in the Global South, Senegal, to exercise universal jurisdiction, because there was a developing paradigm of European courts prosecuting defendants from formerly colonized countries.
It took us 17 years, but Habré became the first prosecution ever of a former head of state using universal jurisdiction, and indeed the first universal jurisdiction trial in Africa.
1998 was a high water mark for international justice with the adoption of the ICC Rome Statute and Pinochet’s arrest. Neither the ICC nor universal jurisdiction have quite lived up to their expectations. Why?
International justice doesn’t operate in a vacuum, it’s conditioned by the global power structure. Each case, whether at the ICC level or the transnational level, is a product of the political forces which must be mobilized, or fended off, to allow a prosecution to proceed.
Those forces, particularly since September 11, 2001, have been hostile to human rights enforcement in general and to justice in particular. Universal jurisdiction has been subject to the same double standards as the ICC.
The Belgian and Spanish universal jurisdiction laws, which were the broadest in the world, were both repealed when they were used to investigate superpower actions.
But many of the most successful cases have been those in which the victims and their activist supporters have been the driving forces, have compiled the evidence themselves, built an advocacy coalition which placed the victims and their stories at the center of the justice struggle and helped create the political will in the forum state.
I’m thinking not just of Habré, but the genocide prosecution in Guatemala of the former dictator Efraín Ríos Montt, the case in Haiti of “President for Life,” Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, the Liberian cases brought around the world by Civitas Maxima and its partners, the Swiss cases initiated by TRIAL International, and the Syria litigation by ECCHR and others.
These cases were brought before domestic courts either of the country in which the atrocities took place (Guatemala, Haiti) or of foreign countries based on universal jurisdiction, rather than before international courts.
Most of these cases took advantage of legal regimes which allowed victims directly to participate in the prosecutions as “parties civiles,” or “acusación particular” rather than play passive or secondary roles in cases prosecuted solely by state or international officials.
How do victim-driven prosecutions look different than institutional cases?
When it’s the victims and their allies who get the cases before a court, who gather the evidence, and who have formal standing as parties, the trials are more likely to live up to their expectations.
In the Rios Montt case, for instance, the Asociación Para la Justicia y Reconciliacion (AJR) and the Centro Para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH) mobilized the victims, developed the evidence, defined the narrative and, essentially, determined the outlines of the case and chose the witnesses who would testify for the prosecution.
In the Habré case, we spent 13 years building the dossier, interviewing hundreds of victims and former officials and uncovering regime police files. The victims’ coalition always insisted that any trial include crimes committed against each of Chad’s victimized ethnic groups, and that is exactly was happened.
In contrast, a distant prosecutor, disconnected from national narratives and inherently not accountable to the victims or civil society, can be tempted to narrowly tailor prosecutions in the hopes of securing a conviction or avoiding political resistance.
This was the case with the ICC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance, where, as Pascal Kambale has persuasively argued, it betrayed the victims’ hopes.
Millions of civilians died in the DRC and Luis Moreno Ocampo only went after two local warlords. I think the current prosecutor is paying more attention to local realities.
The inspiration from victim-driven cases is also greater, and they are to some degree replicable. As Naomi Roht-Arriaza has written, these cases “stirred imaginations and opened possibilities precisely because they seemed decentralized, less controllable by state interests, more, if you will, acts of imagination.”
When I showed Chadian victims video clips of the Ríos Montt trial, they saw in those images exactly what they were trying to do.
Just as the Chadians came to us in the Habré case seeking to do what Pinochet’s victims had done, our hope in getting the Habré case to trial was that other survivors would be inspired by what Habre’s victims had done and say, “you see these people, they fought for justice and never gave up. We can do that too.”
And indeed, Liberian victims and Gambian victims have patterned their campaigns for justice on what Habre’s victims did. So, the Pinochet case continues to be an inspiration.